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CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION AND




1 ORTY-SEVEN states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands have statutes providing for the indemnification of cor-
porate officers, directors, employees, and agents by their respective corpora-
tions. Only Idaho, Illinois, and Vermont have no such statutory pro-
visions.1 Seventeen states have enacted statutory provisions for the purchase
and maintenance of liability insurance covering corporate officers, directors,
and employees. They are Alabama, California, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.! The
concern of the business community over the potential liabilities of cor-
porate officers, directors, employees, and agents is reflected in these legis-
lative enactments, intended to facilitate the providing of protection against
such hazards. The purpose of this Article is to examine the nature and
scope of corporate indemnification and of liability insurance, which is
popularly known as "D and 0" coverage.
I. CORPORATE INDEMNIFICATION
A. Model Act and Delaware Form of Statute
The statutory enactments permitting a corporation to indemnify its
officers, directors, employees, and agents constitute the foundation of the
indemnification process. Most of the states that have enacted such legis-
lation have followed the American Bar Association and the American Law
Institute Model Business Corporation Act.' This model act was prepared
by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law and has been amended from time to time to
meet current demands. As an example, its section 4A, which amended
former section 4(o) in 1967, is particularly appropriate in the light of
recent litigation involving the liabilities of corporate officers and directors.4
The Model Business Corporation Act provisions are of the nonexclusive
type. They permit the corporation to provide the indemnification as pre-
scribed in the Act, but specify that the indemnification provided by the
Act shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which one in-
demnified may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of share-
" B.A., Ohio State University. Attorney at Law, Columbus, Ohio. This Article is based on ma-
terials in the author's book, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors, published by The Allen
Smith Company, Indianapolis.
' See Appendix A for statutory references.
a See Appendix B for statutory references.
3ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (1953, as amended).
4 See, e.g., id. S 4A(f) (1967 amend.). See also Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law
of Indemnification of Directors, Officers, and Others, 23 Bus. LAW. 95 (1967).
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holders, or disinterested directors, or otherwise, both as to action in his
official capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding such
office.'
The Model Act provisions are similar to section 145 (f) of the Delaware
Code,' which will be discussed in some detail in the next section of this
Article. In fact, as to its subsections (a) through (g), the entire Delaware
indemnification statute is fundamentally the same as section 4A of the
Model Business Corporation Act. In 1970 a new subsection (h) was added
to the Delaware indemnification statute, which has no counterpart in the
corporation law of any other state." The amendment stipulates that a
corporation surviving a merger or resulting from a consolidation shall
be obligated to the personnel of an absorbed or merged corporation as if
such personnel had served the surviving or resulting corporation in the
same capacity as they served the absorbed corporation. The new provision
permits the surviving or resulting corporation to take such action as it
deems appropriate to provide continuing indemnification to personnel of
an absorbed or merged corporation who otherwise would probably have
no statutory rights against the surviving or resulting corporation. Until
some decisions have been rendered by the Delaware courts, it cannot be
stated positively whether or not the mandatory indemnification provisions
of the Delaware statute will be applicable to persons covered by the new
subsection (h). Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., discussing the intent of
the Delaware indemnification statute, has written: "The objective .. . is
apparently not to place limits on the protection of guilty management,
but to make explicit the power of management to indemnify itself in
situations where, under the artless enactment of an untutored legislature,
courts and commentators had questioned the propriety of indemnifica-
tion."
8
Despite some earlier criticism of the Delaware indemnification statute,
it, and section 4A of the Model Business Corporation Act from which it
is taken, have served as the pattern for similar enactments in forty other
jurisdictions.! In each of five recent additions to that list, the Delaware
act has served as the prototype."0 Because the Delaware, California, and
New York forms constitute the predominant types of indemnification
statutes, they will be separately discussed.
Analysis of the Delaware Indemnification Statute. Mandatory indemnifi-
cation of a director, officer, employee, or agent of a Delaware corporation
is required if he has been successful on the merits or otherwise in the de-
fense of any derivative or nonderivative action, suit, or proceeding, or in
the defense of any claim, issue, or matter therein." Such mandatory in-
3 But see text accompanying note 52 infra.
0DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (Supp. 1968).
7Id. § 145(h) (Supp. 1970).
8 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of CorPorate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1081 (1968).
'See Appendix A.
'o E.g., statutes of Alabama, Hawaii, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island, cited in Appendix A.
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(c) (Supp. 1968).
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demnification extends to expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually and
reasonably incurred in connection therewith.'" Since the statute extends a
right of indemnity to a director, officer, employee, or agent "of a cor-
poration,' ' and new section 145 (h) defines a corporation to include "all
constituent corporations absorbed in a consolidation or merger,"' 4 there
is substantial justification for taking a position that this right of indemnity
will be applicable to persons covered by the new section. Permissive in-
demnification may be made by a corporation only as authorized in a specific
case, upon a determination that such indemnification is proper because
the director, officer, employee, or agent has met the applicable standard
of conduct." Such determination must be made:
(1) [B]y the board of directors by a majority vote of a quorum of direc-
tors who were not parties to the action, suit or proceeding; or
(2) [I]f such a quorum is not obtainable or, even if obtainable, a quorum
of disinterested directors so directs, by independent legal counsel in a written
opinion; or
(3) By the stockholders. "
Derivative Actions. 7 In the event of a derivative action the applicable
standard of conduct is that the director, officer, employee, or agent acted
in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation." No indemnification may
be made in respect of a claim, issue, or matter as to which such person
was adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance
of his duty to the corporation, unless and only to the extent that a court
determines that, in view of all the circumstances, such person is fairly and
reasonably entitled to indemnification. In a derivative action situation, the
indemnification extends only to expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually
and reasonably incurred.
Nonderivative Actions."5 Nonderivative actions involve an identical stan-
dard of conduct in civil matters. Indemnification may be made if the
director, officer, employee, or agent acted in good faith and in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation. In any criminal action or proceeding, he must have had no
reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination
of any action, suit, or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, con-
viction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, will not, of
itself, create any presumption that the director, officer, employee, or agent
did not meet that standard of care.
"2Id.
1 Id.
14Id. § 145(h) (Supp. 1970).
IsId. § 145(d) (Supp. 1968).
6 Id. In both the Delaware and New York forms of statutes, there is inadequate definition of
"independent legal counsel."
17 Indemnification provisions applicable to derivative actions are found in DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1968).
" The significance of the phrase "or not opposed to" must be recognized. It is also contained
in the Model Act.
" Indemnification provisions applicable to nonderivative actions are found in DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 145(a) (Supp. 1968).
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In a nonderivative action situation the indemnification may extend to
expenses, including attorneys' fees, and also to judgments, fines, and
amounts paid in settlement. Advance payment of expenses is permitted,
if authorized by the board of directors in a specific case and upon the
furnishing of a bond for repayment unless it is ultimately determined
that indemnification was authorized by the statute."0
B. California Form of Statute
Section 830 of California's Corporations Code contains provisions for
both mandatory and permissive indemnification. 1 In either event it appears
that the right to indemnification is determined after the principal action
has been decided."2 Mandatory indemnification of a present or former
director, officer, or employee may be imposed by a court, if both of the
following conditions exist: "(1) The person sued is successful in whole
or in part, or the proceeding against him is settled with the approval of
the court. (2) The court finds that his conduct fairly and equitably per-
mits such indemnity."'
The above provisions apply to any proceeding arising out of the alleged
misfeasance or nonfeasance of a director, officer, or employee in the per-
formance of his duties, or out of any alleged wrongful act against the
corporation or by the corporation." These rights and remedy are exclusive
and are not governed by any provision in the articles or bylaws of the
corporation, or by any resolution or agreement of the corporation, its
directors or its shareholders.' The amount of indemnity will be so much
of the expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in the defense of the
proceeding, as the court determines to be reasonable."
Permissive indemnification of a present or former corporate director,
officer, or employee may be authorized under the California statute by the
board of directors, if it determines in good faith that such director, officer,
or employee was acting in good faith, within what he reasonably believed
to be the scope of his employment or authority and for a purpose which
he reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation or its
shareholders." Permissive indemnification does not apply to an action
instituted or maintained in the right of the corporation by a shareholder
or holder of a voting trust certificate representing shares of the corpora-
tion."8 However, it may include not only expenses, but also the amount
of a judgment or fine rendered or levied against such director, officer, or
employee, and amounts paid in settling an action or threatened action.
'
0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 1968).
"1CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1971).
22See Kaiser v. Easton, 151 Cal. 2d 307, 311 P.2d 108, 9 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1957).
'3CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a) (West Supp. 1971). See also Brokate v. Kehr Mfg. Co., 243 Cal.
2d 133, 52 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1966).
2
4 CAL. CORP. CODE 5 830(a) (West Supp. 1971).
2  Id. 830(e).
201d 830(a).
27Id. 5 830(f). Note that the phrase "or not opposed to" does not appear in the California
statute. As to the Delaware statute, see text accompanying note 18 supra.




California also provides another and quite different type of remedy
in section 834 of its Corporations Code."° That section imposes conditions
on the prosecution of unfounded litigation by disgruntled shareholders
against corporate directors. The plaintiff may be required to provide in-
demnity in favor of the individual defendants and, in a proper case,
indemnity for the corporation to save it harmless from liability assessed
against it under section 830. Under section 834, as under section 830, the
right to indemnification is determined after the action has been tried, and
indemnification is mandatory only in case the court determines that those
seeking indemnity have been successful in the litigation and are fairly and
equitably entitled to recourse against the indemnitor."
C. New York Form of Statute
A somewhat elaborate enactment, set forth in five separate sections of
New York's Business Corporation Law," the New York indemnification
statutes have served as the pattern for similar provisions in New Hamp-
shire and Tennessee."5 Section 722 of the New York act states the exclusive
circumstances under which a person may be entitled to indemnification
for his reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by him in
connection with a derivative action."4 Such indemnification may not extend
to any amounts paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a threatened or
pending action." Expenses may not be included if the action was settled
or otherwise disposed of without court approval." Section 723 sets forth the
exclusive circumstances under which a person may be entitled to in-
demnification for his reasonable expenses incurred, including attorneys'
fees, and for judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement of a suit or
proceeding, civil or criminal, other than a derivative action.'
7
Section 725 provides that a person who has been wholly successful, on
the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any action mentioned in sections
722 and 723 is absolutely entitled to such indemnification, which is man-
datory when awarded by court order upon application." Section 725 also
permits the court to allow a person such reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, during the pendency of the litigation as are necessary in
connection with his defense therein, if the court finds he has raised genuine
issues of fact or law. 3
Permissive indemnification, under the New York law, is dependent upon
particular authorization.' When a person has not been wholly successful in
his defense, and indemnification has not been made mandatory by court
order, it is necessary that permissive indemnification be authorized:
0 Id. § 834.3 Id. § 834(a). See Kaiser v. Easton, 151 Cal. 2d 307, 311 P.2d 108, 9 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1957).
"N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722-26 (McKinney 1963).
33See statutory references in Appendix A.
a
4 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 72 2 (a) (McKinney 1963).
3'Id. § 722(b) (1).
3' td. § 722 (b) (2).
37 Id. § 723.
'Slt. § 725(a); see id. 5 724(a).
3 Id. 5 725(c).
40 Id. 5 724(b).
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(1) By the board of directors, acting by a quorum consisting of directors
who were not parties to the action or proceeding, upon a finding that the
director or officer has met the applicable standard of conduct; or
(2) If a quorum ... is not obtainable with due diligence; (A) By the board
of directors upon the written opinion of independent legal counsel that in-
demnification is proper because the applicable standard of conduct has been
met; or (B) By the shareholders upon a finding that the applicable standard
of conduct has been met.4'
However, section 726 contains strict requirements precluding indemnifi-
cation under specified circumstances.' The particular restrictions are:
(1) That the indemnification would be inconsistent with the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corporation which prohibits or
otherwise limits such indemnification;
(2) That the indemnification would be inconsistent with a provision of
the certificate of incorporation, a bylaw, a resolution of the board or of
the shareholders, an agreement or other proper corporate action, in effect at
the time of the accrual of the alleged cause of action asserted in the threat-
ened or pending action or proceeding in which the expenses were incurred or
other amounts paid, which prohibits or otherwise limits indemnification; or
(3) That where a settlement was approved by the court, the indemnifi-
cation would be inconsistent with any condition with respect to indemnifi-
cation expressly imposed by the court in approving the settlement.'
One unique provision of the New York law is contained in section
726(c)." If indemnification is paid other than pursuant to a court order
or action by the shareholders, the corporation must mail to its shareholders
of record a statement specifying the persons paid, the amounts paid, and
the nature and status of the litigation or threatened litigation at the time
of such payment. Time limits for the mailing are prescribed in the section.
By an amendment of section 726, effective September 1, 1969, New
York's indemnification statutes and the insurance provisions thereof are
made applicable to domestic corporations and foreign corporations doing
business in New York, with certain exceptions." These exceptions, provided
in section 1320 of the Business Corporation Law, appear to exempt from
the indemnification statutes such foreign corporations as (1) have their
shares listed on a national securities exchange, or (2) allocate less than one
half their business income for the preceding fiscal years to New York for
franchise tax purposes.
Exclusive Statutory Provisions: Comparison between Delaware and New
York. New York declares that its statutory indemnification provisions are
exclusive.' In view of this declaration, it may be contended that in New
York no charter or bylaw provision on indemnification is necessary.' In
,1 Id.
'2id. 5 726.
431d. 5 726(b). No such restrictions are found in the Delaware statute, taken from ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4A (1967 amend.), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (Supp. 1968).
44N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 726(c) (McKinney 1963).
45 Ch. 1007, § 2, [1969] N.Y. Laws 1550.
46 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKinney 1963).4 71d. § 721.
"'See Israels, A New Look at Corporate Directorship, 24 Bus. LAW. 727, 736-37 (1969).
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Delaware a bylaw identical to the statute, but making indemnification
mandatory, has been upheld,49 as has a bylaw broader in scope than the
statute." A bylaw more restrictive than the Delaware statute was upheld
by the Delaware court, which observed that a corporation "is free to invoke
less than all the indemnification power granted it under this particular
statute . . . ."" Conversely, the Ninth Circuit ignored the nonexclusive
provision of the Delaware statute ' and denied indemnification in a case
decided in 1963." Shareholders had already commenced a derivative action
against several directors and officers, charging misconduct and negligence,
when the board of directors passed a resolution to indemnify all directors
and officers against every kind of liability. The Ninth Circuit found that
this resolution violated the "negligence or misconduct" provisions of the
statute," because the shareholders were successful in their derivative action.
This decision indicates that the "nonexclusive" provision of the Delaware
statute and others like it will probably be held subject to the "negligence
and misconduct" clause under most circumstances." On the other hand,
such a result is substantially the same as that which should be anticipated
under the mandatory indemnification provision of the California form of
statute, which requires a court determination that the conduct of the
person sued "fairly and equitably merits" inden-inificationY
D. The Texas Statute
In Texas the indemnification statute is substantially the same as former
section 4 (o) of the Model Business Corporation Act before it was super-
seded by new section 4A, which is the foundation of the Delaware pro-
vision. Article 2.02 (16) of the Texas Business Corporation Act empowers
corporations to indemnify present and former directors, officers, and others
for expenses incurred in defending any proper official act.5" This statute is
of the nonexclusive type and is, in this respect, comparable to the present
Model Act and the Delaware statute. Also, the Texas statute expressly
prohibits indemnification in relation to matters where the person involved
is adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in performance of
duty. Thus, as noted in the preceding section of this Article, the nonexclu-
sive provision is subject to the negligence and misconduct clause. Indus-
trial growth in Texas has resulted in expansion of corporate activity. A
natural result may be an increase in shareholders' suits, derivative actions,
and other proceedings affecting the liability of corporate officers and di-
rectors. Thus, it would seem appropriate for the legislature to act to bring
4 Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371, 164 A.2d 437
(Ch. 1960).
5 Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
" Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (Ch. 1962).
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 145(f) (Supp. 1968).
aTeren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963).
"
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1968).
"
5 Cf. Globus Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Con-
tinental Growth Fund, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
'See CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a)(2) (West Supp. 1971).
5T TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(16) (1956).
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the Texas indemnification and liability insurance statutes in line with the
country-wide trend.
E. Indemnification in SEC Transactions
Liability arising out of actions under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities
Act of 193 3,"8 under section 17(a) of that Act," or under section 10 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19340 and rule 10b- 5 " promulgated
pursuant thereto, may present special problems of corporate indemnification
as well as with respect to liability insurance. Carlos Israels has written:
"[I]f a corporation has paid the premium costs ...I suggest that it has
indemnified the director in a manner which the SEC at least has clearly
indicated it considers contrary to public policy."6
By a note to its rule 260 under the 1933 Act, the SEC has made it a
condition to the acceleration of a registration statement that the registrant
must, unless all claims for indemnification are waived, state that the SEC
deems indemnification arrangements to be against public policy as ex-
pressed in the Act and, therefore, unenforceable.6 The registrant must also
agree that, unless the matter is settled by controlling precedent, it will
submit any claim for indemnification for Securities Act liabilities (other
than for the expenses of a successful defense) to a court for adjudication,
and will consent to be bound by the court's decision." The language of the
note indicates it applies to compromises and settlements as well as judg-
ments.
The only significant reported case dealing with public policy and cor-
porate indemnification is Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc." It is notable
not only for its denial of indemnity to an underwriter, but also for its
determination that punitive or exemplary damages would not be awarded
for a violation of section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193466
or section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.67 In the opinion Circuit
Judge Irving R. Kaufman mentioned the SEC attitude toward indemnifi-
cation and suggested that directors, officers, controlling persons, and under-
writers perhaps should be treated alike in respect to indemnification."
As is noted in other parts of this Article, serious question exists as to the
extent that directors' and officers' liability insurance policies afford cover-
age for liabilities arising under the SEC statutes and rules. Professor Joseph
W. Bishop, Jr., who has written extensively in this field, noted the hazards
of such claims during a 1969 symposium:
[I]t must be admitted that no one today can accurately forecast the size of
5815 U.S.C. 55 77k, 771 (1971).
581Id. § 77q(a).
60Id. § 78j(b).
6' 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
2 Israels, upra note 48, at 738. See also Comment, Indemnification of the Corporate Insider:
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 54 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1970).
63Note to rule 260 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1968).
64 Id.
82287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
6615 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971).
6 7 Id. § 77g(a).
6418 F.2d at 1288.
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the risk which is created by the prospect of increasingly vigorous enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws, both by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and by private litigants. That risk includes, of course, not only
fines and amounts paid in satisfaction of judgment or to compromise claims,
but also legal expenses, which are likely to be high in this kind of litigation."9
It is not likely that the public policy question will be settled soon. Most
observers see nothing improper in the indemnification of corporate officers
and directors when they are successful in their defenses. Even in the case
of unsuccessful defenses, there are indications that indemnification against
expenses would be sustained." Indemnification against judgments, amounts
paid in settlement, and especially fines and penalties presents a more diffi-
cult problem. Perhaps the primary question for determination is whether
compensation or deterrence is the intended objective of the laws that im-
pose liability upon corporate officers and directors.
The Penn Central failure has brought forth considerable litigation
against that railroad's officers and directors as well as some extensive investi-
gations by the Committee on Banking and Currency of the House of
Representatives."1 The committee's chairman, Representative Wright Pat-
man (D.-Tex.), is reported to have "launched a vigorous campaign to halt
the increasing acceptance by states of laws specifically allowing corpora-
tions to pay for insurance against wrong doing by their directors and
officers."'" According to further reports he contends that "state laws per-
mitting the purchase of such policies undermine numerous federal statutes,
including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Sherman Act, the Internal Revenue Code and various federal statutes
imposing civil liability on responsible corporate officials.""
As noted earlier, forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands now provide by statute for the indemnification
of corporate officers, directors, employees, and agents, while only seventeen
states to date expressly provide by statute for liability insurance for such
purposes. At least until the Penn Central failure the trend appeared favor-
able to such indemnification and liability insurance in supplementation of
it. Representative Patman's "campaign" appears to be directed against D
and 0 insurance, especially where the violation of federal laws is: involved.
In Canada, however, the new Business Corporations Act which became
effective January 1, 1971, prohibits indemnification unless the directors
achieve "complete or substantial success" in actions brought against them. "
That requirement is similar to the present law of Texas." The Patman
"campaign" and the Ontario statute are suggestive of things to come in re-
" Bishop, Protecting Corporate Executives Against Liability and Expense Under the Federal
Security Laws, in EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY 155-69 (Institute
of Continuing Legal Education 1969).
70 Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
1 STAFF REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE PENN CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Comm. Print 1970
(2 parts), 1971 (2 parts)).
72 BUSINESS INSURANCE, Mar. 1, 1971, at 4.
" Id.
'
4 ONTARIO Bus. CORP. ACT § 147(2) (1971).
"
5 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. S 2.02(16) (1956).
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gard to indemnification as well as liability insurance. Meanwhile, on the
other hand, New York has a relatively new statute which declares it to be
the public policy of that state to spread the risk of corporate management,
notwithstanding any other general or special law of New York, or of any
other jurisdiction, including the federal government."6 Perhaps this New
York statute indicates what other states will do in the future.
II. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Liability insurance is tending to become a moderately popular means of
supplementing statutory and bylaw indemnification of corporate officers,
directors, and employees, although its effectiveness to accomplish its in-
tended purpose has been the subject of considerable controversy. The
original form of blanket policy for a corporation and its officers and direc-
tors was provided by Lloyd's of London, which is still the principal source
of this type of coverage." This form is in two inseparable parts. The first
part reimburses the corporation for payments actually made by it in the
indemnification of its directors and officers. The second part insures the
individual officers and directors against losses for which they have not been
otherwise indemnified. There is a deductible feature and a co-insurance
feature."8 In addition to the Lloyd's policies, there are also several different
D and 0 policies being written by American insurers,"9 some of which are
tailored for specific purposes, as will be noted.
A. Statutory Provisions
In all of the indemnification statutes discussed above except that of
Texas express provisions authorizing the purchase and maintenance of such
insurance will be found."0 Altogether seventeen states have enacted statu-
tory provisions of this nature.8 ' In most instances the insurance policy
authorized by statute may cover liability asserted against or incurred by a
corporate officer, director, or employee, whether or not the corporation
would have the power to indemnify him against such liability under the
provisions of the indemnification statute." Nevertheless, the policy itself
may exclude some such elements of liability. The Second Circuit has re-
iterated the rule that "one cannot insure himself against his own reckless,
willful or criminal misconduct."" And the general counsel of one of the
leading underwriters of such insurance"M has noted that "any act which
"8 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney 1969).
" W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 10.01, at 173 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as KNEPPER].8 Id. §§ 10.03, 10.05-12. See also Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and
S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681, 685-86 (1969).
78 KNEPPER § 10.03.
'°ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4A(g) (1953); CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(h) (West
Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 727
(McKinney 1970).
" See Appendix B.
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968).
aGlobus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969).




offends the public policy is uninsurable in most cases, such as acts of will-
ful neglect, gross negligence, and fraud, with certain exceptions. '
The Recent New York Statute. In one instance the statutory provisions
authorizing corporations to purchase and maintain directors' and officers'
liability insurance are so specific that they merit particular mention. Ef-
fective September 1, 1969,'o section 727 of New York's Business Corpora-
tion Law was enacted to permit a corporation to purchase and maintain
insurance:
(1) to indemnify the corporation for any obligation it incurs as a result of
the indemnification of directors and officers under the provisions of section
722 and 726.
(2) to indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they may be
indemnified by the corporation under those sections; and
(3) to indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they may not
otherwise be indemnified by the corporation under the above sections, pro-
vided the insurance policy allows for a retention amount and for co-insurance
in a manner acceptable to the superintendent of insurance."7
Such insurance is subject to specified restrictions spelled out in section
727. While the insurance may be included in a single contract or supple-
ment thereto, retrospective rating is prohibited. No insurance may provide
for payment other than the cost of defense (1) in relation to any risk the
insurance of which is prohibited by New York law, or (2) if a final
adjudication adverse to the insured director or officer establishes that his
acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were material to the cause of action,
or that he personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage
to which he was not legally entitled. Within the time prescribed in section
726 the corporation must mail to its shareholders a statement specifying the
insurance carrier, date of the contract, cost of insurance purchased or re-
newed, corporate positions insured, and a statement explaining all sums
(not previously reported in a statement to shareholders) paid under any
indemnification insurance contract.88
In this enactment the New York legislature stated that it was the public
policy of that state to spread the risk of corporate management, notwith-
standing any other general or special law of New York or of any other
jurisdiction-including the federal government. This provision apparently
constitutes an official response to questions such as those raised by Professor
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., for example, as to the validity of such insurance in
the light of public policy.89
B. The Pillsbury Incident
The Model Act provision permitting a corporation to purchase and
maintain insurance on its officers, directors, and other employees' may
s' Snow, Liability of Directors and Officers of Corporations, 17 DEFENSE L.J. 521, 541 (1968).
"
8 Ch. 1007, § 1, [1969] N.Y. Laws 1550.
"7 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney 1970).
88 id.
89 Bishop, supra note 8, at 1091.
"1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4A(g) (1953).
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conflict with a corporation's charter, regulations, or bylaws. Such a poten-
tial conflict was dealt with in the Notice of Annual Meeting of Stock-
holders of The Pillsbury Company held September 9, 1969. The Pillsbury
Corporation exists under the General Corporation Law of Delaware, sec-
tion 145 (g) of which is identical to the above-mentioned Model Act pro-
vision. The subsection permits the corporation to purchase and maintain
such insurance whether or not the corporation would have the power to
indemnify the officer, director, or employee under the provisions of section
145.
The power of The Pillsbury Company to indemnify its officers and di-
rectors was contained in section 6 of article VIII of its bylaws, which pro-
hibited indemnification of a director or officer found to be derelict in the
performance of his duty to the company, or for any amounts paid to the
company in settlement or judgment in derivative suits by a director or
officer. The board of directors was considering insurance coverage of the
type permitted by section 145 of the Delaware law, which would extend
to the two areas where indemnity by the company was prohibited. To avoid
any possibility of conflict with section 6 of article VIII of the company's
bylaws, the board of directors deemed it desirable to obtain stockholder
authority to pay the entire premium for such insurance. In requesting and
recommending the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the
common and preferred shares to approve the insurance proposal, the board
of directors stated to the stockholders:
There are no actions or proceedings now pending to which the proposed in-
surance would apply, and the Board of Directors has no knowledge of any
threatened action or proceeding of any kind. Nonetheless, the widespread
activities of the Company necessarily subject its officers and directors to the
complexities and uncertainties of an ever growing body of State and Federal
laws and regulations, thus resulting in an increased exposure to extensive and
expensive legal proceedings. As a matter of fairness to its officers and direc-
tors, and in order that the Company may retain capable people in these posi-
tions and continue to attract such people, the Board of Directors recom-
mends that the Company be specifically empowered to pay the full premium
on such insurance in the event such insurance is purchased. 1
Although the Internal Revenue Service had ruled in the summer of 1969
that the premiums on such policies were proper business expenses of the
company," the potential conflict between the insurance coverage and the
company's bylaws made stockholder approval of the transaction an ad-
visable course--especially since the estimated annual cost of such insurance
was $40,000.
C. Validity and Effectiveness of D and 0 Policies
Professor Bishop wrote in 1969 that the "draftsmanship of the Direc-
tors' and Officers' Liability policies now on the market is so ambiguous and
obscure that it is difficult to say whether and to what extent" they cover
"1 The Pillsbury Company, Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders to be held September 9,
1969, at 8.
9 Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 22.
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certain liabilities."3 The policies available today are in substantially the same
forms as in 1969. In the same article Professor Bishop also wrote: "Aside
from the appalling draftsmanship, which makes it nearly impossible to de-
termine the extent of the coverage, there are no reliable statistics on the
incidence of the risk, and there cannot be until the scope of that risk has
been more clearly demarcated by the federal courts."" While Professor
Bishop was writing about liabilities arising principally under the federal
securities laws, other writers have been highly critical of the scope and
effectiveness of the D and 0 coverage, especially under part II relating to
the individual officers and directors."'
On February 16, 1971, representatives of Lloyd's of London brought
suit in Philadelphia to rescind D and 0 policies issued to the Penn Central
Company effective July 3, 1968, with limits of $10 million, for a premium
of $305,660 paid by the corporation." That litigation induced Business
Insurance to editorialize: "We, as others, have long questioned the value
of D and 0. We do so again.""7 And that editorial, in turn, brought a
vigorous response from Thomas F. Sheehan, President of Excess Under-
writers, Inc., who analyzed the Lloyd's litigation at some length and wrote,
in part: "Recission or cancellation of insurance is appropriate to all classes
of insurance. The availability of the remedy of recission to the underwriter
who has been deceived by the applicant does not signify that those classes
of insurance are not essential to the protection of forthright insureds.""
Noting that on February 17, 1971, certain present and former officers of
Penn Central sued the underwriters for injunction and denied any negli-
gence or wrongdoing, Mr. Sheehan pointed out: "D & 0 policies do not
exclude practically everything. Specially [sic] they do not exclude the
charge of conflict of interest. Further, if all your readers ask themselves
the question 'Am I innocent of the charges made?' where they can answer
'Yes' they can expect their D & 0 insurance to respond.""9 The dispute be-
tween Penn Central's directors and the Lloyd's underwriters will probably
not be resolved for some years, but in the meantime many others are con-
cerned with obligations and rights under policies of this type.
Stewart, Smith & Co., Inc., is a leader in marketing D and 0 insurance.
Policy forms bearing the "SS" symbol are commonly known as "Lloyd's
forms" and are issued through Stewart, Smith facilities. The Stewart,
Smith brochure, published in 1970 to assist in promoting the sale of such
policies, reports that more than $2.5 billion of directors' and officers' liabil-
ity coverage has been effected through the Stewart, Smith offices since 1963,
involving "some seven hundred of the largest corporations in the United
States." '' And the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a corporation
3 Bishop, supra note 69, at 165.
94Id. at 166.
9'Olson, D d 0 Liability Coverage--Fact or Fiction, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Oct. 13, 1969,
at 37-38.
"Bird v. Penn Central Co., Civil No. 71-358 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 16, 1971).
0*BUSINESS INSURANCE, Mar. 15, 1971, at 16.
"Id., Apr. 12, 1971, at 16.
99 Id.
"' Stewart, Smith & Co., Inc., Brochure (1970).
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may pay the premiums on such policies "to protect its business by limiting
its liability for such wrongful acts and to assure the taxpayer that its
officers and directors can make necessary corporate decisions without fear
of legal entanglement."' ' Whatever may be the result of the judicial inter-
pretation of the policy language, a review of some of the various types of
policies may be helpful at this juncture.
D. Types of Coverage
The "Mini" Program. Late in 1969 the American States Insurance Com-
pany introduced what it called a "mini" directors and officers policy for
"small" commercial, financial, and industrial risks. It announced that this
policy was designed for financial institutions with assets of $40 million or
less and for modest-sized nonfinancial corporations with assets of $10 mil-
lion or less but with minimum assets of at least $ 5 million.1" American
Home Assurance Company writes a similar "mini" policy, as does Pacific
Indemnity Company'' through the Stewart, Smith offices. Wohlreich &
Anderson, Ltd., markets a policy of like type especially designed for savings
and loan associations. Undoubtedly other insurers make comparable offer-
ings.
Stewart, Smith makes its "mini" program available to financial institu-
tions with deposits of $5 million to $100 million, corporations with assets
not over $7.5 million and a net worth of at least $1 million, and nonprofit
organizations having assets not over $100 million.'" A maximum coverage
of $1 million is written in this "mini" program. In some instances, the
"mini" policy is written as a single policy, instead of in two parts as in the
case of the so-called "maxi" policy on the original Lloyd's of London form.
Thus, the "mini" policy of Pacific Indemnity Company includes coverage
for directors and officers and for company reimbursement in the same
insuring clause.'" This style is somewhat similar to the form in general use
by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which includes both types
of risks in the same insuring clause.' Also, the American Home Insurance
Company combines into one policy its coverages for directors' and officers'
liability and organization reimbursement insurance."
In most cases the minimum retention'" under the "mini" policy is
$5,000. Co-insurance, with five per cent participation by the insured, is
customary. Minimum three-year prepaid premiums may be as low as $ 5,000
to $7,500. One company noted this as a reduction from a premium of
$17,500 previously charged for similar D and 0 coverage.' 9
'0' Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 22.
0' BUSINESS INSURANCE, Dec. 8, 1969, at 53.
'"3Id., Jan. 19, 1970, at 58.
104 In its form letter outlining the qualifications and information required for quotations, Stew-
art, Smith points out that closely held corporations are not acceptable, and that a company must
have been in business for at least five years, with a profit history and a record of dividend pay-
ments.
... Stewart, Smith Form SS/2.
'0' St. Paul Form 16253COP-Rev. 1-67.
107 American Home Form 3195.
'0' The "retention" is an amount deducted from a loss and paid by the insured before the
insurer is required to pay; i.e., a "deductible."
'"BUsINESS INSURANCE, Dec. 8, 1969, at 53.
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The "Maxi'" Program. Except for the policy issued by St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company, most of the D and 0 insurance (sometimes
referred to as the "maxi" program) is written in the two-part form men-
tioned above."0 Stewart, Smith informs those who inquire that the require-
ments for consideration include "a publicly owned corporation that has a
steady history of earnings with $5,000,000 or more in assets, $10,000,000
or more in sales and has been in business at least five years. There must also
be continuity of management, a low, long-term indebtedness ratio com-
pared to capitalization, and absence of current litigation.'1
This type of coverage is individually underwritten and rated by all in-
surers. Quotations are usually for three years. A minimum retention of
$20,000 is usually required, although in some cases the deductible may be
varied on the basis of underwriting judgment and increased to $100,000
or more. Higher corporate retentions might be applied to risks which are
subject to considerable litigation, such as conglomerates, real estate holding
and development corporations, and companies susceptible to antitrust
charges. There is usually five per cent participation by the insured, which
cannot be covered by insurance. Reports are that "the average purchase has
been for a limit of $5,000,000.""'1 2
It is difficult to suggest the ranges of premium rates for this type of
liability insurance because all such coverages are individually underwritten
and rated. In 1966 it was reported that a premium of $15,000 to $50,000
might be charged for a limit of $5 million for three years."' During the
period between 1965 and early 1969 the premium rates approximately
tripled."" In a booklet published in early 1970 Dr. Thomas F. Sheehan






However, those rates are described as minimum rates and may not exem-
plify what the policies would actually cost after individual underwriting
and rating.
Also, there are strong indications that further rate increases may be in
the offing. In an advertisement in Business Insurance last summer one
American insurer reported:
But the London underwriters who reinsure most or all Directors' and Offi-
cers' policies sold in the United States are very unhappy with their experi-
ence to date. They are alarmed by sky-rocketing 'advised losses' (British
"1See Bishop, supra note 8, at 1086; Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80
HARe. L. REv. 648 (1967).
"'Form letter supplied Aug. 20, 1970, by Paul W. Suit, Vice President, Stewart, Smith Mid
America, Inc., Chicago.
112 Id.
"' BUSINESS WEEK, July 2, 1966, at 56.
"' Knepper, Let the Director Beware, 37 INs. CouNs. J. 27, 34 (1970).
115 T. SHEEHAN, THE LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: WITH PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
FOR THEIR DISCHARGE 18 (1970).
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for reserves). They are shocked by pyramiding legal costs. Last May's rate
boost already appears to have been inadequate. Some of them are tinkering
with revisions that would narrow the coverage, or reduce available limits, or
incorporate substantial deductibles with no increase of premium."'
The Coverage Provided. In a general way the "mini" and "maxi" policies
provide similar coverage that is not a duplication of the protection afforded
by any other type of liability insurance policy. The comprehensive general
liability form does not contemplate risks such as are insured against by the
D and 0 policy, and the professional liability and errors and omissions
coverages are not applicable, except in rare instances.
The term "Wrongful Act" is an essential element in defining coverage
of most D and 0 policies except that offered by St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company. "Wrongful Act" is defined in the Stewart, Smith
"maxi" policy as follows:
Wrongful Act shall mean any actual or alleged error or misstatement or mis-
leading statement or act or omission or neglect or breach of duty by the
Assureds while acting in their individual or collective capacities or any mat-
ter, not excluded by the terms and conditions of this policy, claimed against
them solely by reason of their being Directors or Officers of the Company.'17
In the Stewart, Smith "mini" policy the language defining this term states:
"Wrongful Act shall mean any actual or alleged error or misstatement or
misleading statement or act or omission or neglect or breach of duty by the
Directors and Officers in the discharge of their duties, individually or col-
lectively, or any matter claimed against them solely by reason of their
being Directors or Officers of the Company..' ... The American Home As-
surance Company states the definition in some different terms, as follows:
"The term 'Wrongful Act' shall mean any breach of duty, neglect, error,
misstatement, misleading statement, omission or other act done or wrong-
fully attempted by the Insureds or any of the foregoing so alleged by any
claimant or any matter claimed against them solely by reason of their being
such Directors or Officers . . . ,' The definition used by American States
Insurance Company2 ' is substantially the same as the American Home
definition."'
In the D and 0 policy offered by the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company" the term "Wrongful Act" does not appear and, instead, the
indemnification is against any claim "caused by any negligent act, any
error, any omission or any breach of duty while acting in their capacities
as Directors or Officers.""' The foregoing policy terms are substantially
I1"BUSINESS INSURANCE, Aug. 17, 1970, at 5.
.17 Stewart, Smith Forms SS-3A, SS-3B. The word "Assureds" is changed to "Directors or
Officers" in Form SS-3B (the Company Reimbursement part).
'" Stewart, Smith Form SS/2.
" American Home Forms 2085, 2086 11/67. "Insureds" is changed to "Directors or Officers"
in Form 2085 (the Company Reimbursement part).
0"American States Form 9-597 12-69.
121Id. Form 3195 is also similar. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
" See St. Paul Form 16253COP-Rev. 1-67.




the same as in earlier drafts of these policy forms." They have not yet
undergone court tests but appear to be sufficiently broad to cover most
hazards contemplated by such insurance.
The Exclusions. As is frequently the situation with respect to liability in-
surance policies, the exclusions in both the "mini" and "maxi" programs
are of considerable significance. Because there are language differences in
the two-part "maxi" policy as compared with the single policy, it may be
helpful to deal first with the separate exclusions in the two-part policy.'
In the Company Reimbursement part'" there are only three exclusions.
The first exclusion makes the policy excess insurance over any other existing
valid policy or policies under which payment of the loss is actually made.
Other D and 0 coverage, professional liability insurance, or errors and
omissions policies might afford other insurance in some respects. The second
exclusion under this part applies if a prior policy, which has expired, is
available for coverage. The language of this exclusion is somewhat am-
biguous, but it would probably apply only if liability could be enforced
under the prior policy. It is intended to avoid the pyramiding of coverages.
The third exclusion relates to claims based on personal injury, death, or
property damage. This exclusion is obvious, because the D and 0 policy
was never intended to cover such claims. This exclusion is not contained in
many policy forms probably because it is deemed unnecessary and super-
fluous. The first and second exclusions, in effect, are found in most D and
O policies, whether "mini" or "maxi" and whether two-part or single
policies, and are applicable both to company reimbursement and directors'
and officers' individual or collective liability.
In the Directors' and Officers' Liability part of the two-part "maxi"
policy' " are the three exclusions mentioned above and six more. These ex-
clusions apply separately to each officer and director. A fact pertaining to
one insured may not be imputed to any other insured for the purpose of
determining the applicability of any exclusion. The apparent intent of this
provision is to indemnify an innocent director, even though he may be
held vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of a fellow director.
Libel or slander is not covered by this policy. It must be insured against
in some other form of corporate insurance, such as the general public
liability policy. If the insured officers or directors have been indemnified
by their corporation, they cannot recover again under this part of the
policy. On the other hand, if they have not been indemnified, their rights
may be maintained under this part. And, as noted above,' 8 in most stat-
utes permitting a corporation to purchase and maintain liability insurance,
authority is granted to insure whether or not the corporation could law-
fully indemnify.'"
"54See KNEPPER § 10.06, at 182.
"This discussion is based on Stewart, Smith Forms SS-3A and SS-3B.
... Stewart, Smith Form SS-3B.
17 Id. Form SS-3A.
... See text accompanying notes 82, 87 supra.
"'See also Brook, Officers and Directors Liability Insurance, 2 THE FORUM 228, 23 5-37 (1967).
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Another important exclusion denies coverage if a claim is "based upon or
attributable to their gaining in fact any personal profit or advantage to
which they were not legally entitled." Substantially that same language ap-
pears in all of the various policy forms. However, it presents some prob-
lems of construction. It is, of course, intended to deny coverage to any
director or officer who employs the corporate facilities for his own advan-
tage or profit. This exclusion is different from some others in that they
relate to claims "for" certain matters while this provision excludes a claim
"based upon or attributable to" gaining such profit or advantage. Thus,
this exclusion may apply even though the complaint against the director
does not expressly assert that he gained such profit or advantage. More-
over, section 727 of the New York Business Corporation Law requires that
such an exclusion be read into every policy, except as to the cost of de-
fense.'"
Another significant exclusion denies coverage if a claim is "brought
about or contributed to by the dishonesty of the Assureds." In most policy
forms.. this exclusion contains a proviso that there will be coverage "unless
a judgment or other final adjudication thereof adverse to the Assureds
shall establish the acts of active and deliberate dishonesty committed by
the Assured with actual dishonest purpose and intent were material to the
cause of action so adjudicated.""' This proviso contains four elements which
must be established by the insurance company in order to escape liability
under the dishonesty exclusion, namely (1) a judgment or other final
adjudication adverse to the assureds, (2) which established that the as-
sureds committed acts of active and deliberate dishonesty, (3) that such
acts were committed with actual dishonest purpose and intent, and (4)
that such acts were material to the cause of action so adjudicated. The
courts would be expected to construe any ambiguities in that proviso most
strongly against the insurance company. Hence, it will take a strong case
to avoid coverage on this ground. In New York, section 727 of the Busi-
ness Corporation Law prohibits payment other than the cost of defense
if a final adjudication adverse to the insured director or officer establishes
that his acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were material to the cause
of action. '
The policy does not require the insurer to pay for the return by the as-
sureds of any remuneration paid to them without the previous approval of
the shareholders if the courts have held such payment illegal. And no pay-
ment is required for an accounting of profits made under the short-swing
provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'" or
similar provisions of any state statutory or common law."3
Allowing for differences in context, most of the foregoing exclusions,
"'N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney 1970).
131 This is not so in American Home Form 3195. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
... Stewart, Smith Forms SS/2, SS/3A; American Home Forms 2086, 3062; American States
Form 9-594. The language is not identical in all forms.
"'N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney 1970).
"415 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1971).
" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 727 (McKinney 1970).
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in quite similar language, will be found in the various policy forms pre-
viously mentioned.
Proposal Forms, Applications, and Warranties. In view of the Penn Central
litigation mentioned above,"" some attention should be directed to the
forms of application and proposal required to be completed by applicants
for D and 0 insurance, and to the warranties by those issued in relation to
statements in the proposal. The Lloyd's primary policy involved in the
Penn Central litigation consisted of Forms SS-3A and SS-3B, which have
been under discussion, and certain endorsements. The proposal form, which
constituted a part of the insurance contract, stated: "[Ilt is agreed that this
form shall be the basis of the contract should a policy be issued, and this
form will be attached and become part of the policy." Clause 6 in both
Forms SS-3A and SS-3B stated: "It is warranted that the particulars and
statements contained in the written proposal, copy of which is attached
hereto, and the Declarations are the basis of this policy and are to be con-
sidered as incorporated in and constituting part of this policy."
The Lloyd's complaint against Penn Central and seventy present or past
directors or officers of the corporation alleged that item 10 of the proposal
form posed this question: "No person proposed for this insurance is cog-
nizant of any act, error, or omission which he has reason to suppose might
afford grounds for any future claim such as would fall within the scope
of the proposed insurance, except as follows ....""
The response to that question, signed by the chairman of Penn Central's
Finance Committee, was: "None known." His signature constituted a
declaration "that to the best of his knowledge" the statements set forth in
the proposal form were true. In the recission action"' the representatives
of Lloyd's alleged that: "This response was false and was known to be
false . . . and was made in bad faith with actual intent to deceive the
plaintiffs by concealing from the plaintiffs material facts which, if dis-
closed, would have resulted in plaintiffs' refusal to issue the subject
policies." ' " It is true in most such actions that the final decision will de-
pend upon the resolution of disputed facts. Meanwhile the Penn Central
litigation has provided an opportunity for proponents and opponents of
D and 0 insurance to make charges and countercharges that will probably
cause public and governmental agencies to take a renewed interest in this
type of coverage.'40
While the identical interrogatory propounded in the Penn Central pro-
posal form does not appear in all D and 0 proposal forms, most such
applications do contain similar questions. For example, American Home
Form 3092 inquires:
20. Does any Director or Officer have knowledge or information of any act,
136 See text accompanying note 96 supra.
... Complaint at 11, Bird v. Penn Central Co., Civil No. 71-358 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 16, 1971).
'"Bird v. Penn Central Co., Civil No. 71-358 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 16, 1971).
"' Complaint at 14, 17.




error, or omission which might give rise to a claim under the proposed
policy?
St. Paul's form of application states:
16(b) No officer or director has knowledge or information of any negligent
act, error or omission which might give rise to a claim against them.
No exceptions
Except as follows:
It is agreed that if such knowledge or information exists, any claim
or action subsequently arising therefrom shall be excluded from this
proposed coverage.
(Answer - Yes or No)
The words, "grounds for any future claim," in the Penn Central proposal
form appear as "valid grounds for any future claim" in some proposals.14" '
In his letter to the editor of Business Insurance, Thomas F. Sheehan,
President of Excess Underwriters, Inc., asserts that the holding in the Penn
Central case will not necessarily apply to all D and 0 policies.'" He states:
"The applications in use by some companies merely state that the signer
declares that to the best of his knowledge and belief the statements set
forth therein are true. Also, the application is not incorporated into the
policy. There is then no such warranty.''. Such is the stuff of which law-
suits are made. However, counsel for both an insurer and those to be in-
sured will do well to be aware of the hazards inherent in the interrogatories
propounded in D and 0 proposal forms.
SEC Liability Insurance. Corporate directors and officers, their corporation,
and underwriters involved in a primary distribution or secondary or com-
bined offering may obtain specific-issue coverage against claims arising out
of the transaction.'" Also, it is reported that blanket coverage may be ob-
tained by an underwriter, insuring it against civil liability under the
securities laws arising out of all underwritings in which it participated
during the period."
There are two forms of such policies in fairly common use. The so-called
"London" form, written through Lloyd's brokers as well as American
agents,'" is not substantially different from the "American" form, issued
by Seaboard Surety Company and a few other companies. In either in-
stance minor changes in the forms may be negotiated. Such insurance is
often required by the underwriter of a primary offering. The availability
of the insurance will depend in large measure upon the competence of the
underwriters and of the attorneys and accountants representing the various
parties, as appraised by the insurers. Deductibles, varying with the quality
of the case, may be required. Premium rates are on the high side and may
141 Stewart, Smith proposal form D40 1023 11/69; Form ALS (D. PPL) 2/1/67.
142 BUSINESS INSURANCE, Apr. 12, 1971, at 16.
143 id.
'"Brochure of Stewart, Smith, Haidinger, Inc., Los Angeles, identified as SEC 201691, S-i,
S-2, and Addendum No. 1 (1969).
'" Kroll, supra note 78, at 685-86.
14 Stewart, Smith Form S-'/, SEC 201691.
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not be negotiable. As a rule such a policy will be written for fifty per cent
of the offering price, but may go as high as one hundred per cent. Since
the issuing corporation has the primary liability, the risk with respect to
the officers and directors probably has little effect on the premium charged.
In the London form the exclusions are for (1) actions by the SEC or
any other governmental agency; (2) loss, liability, cost or expense based
on or arising in connection with any criminal proceeding; (3) any liability
assumed under a contractual agreement; and (4) losses based on insider
trading.47 Clause III (b) of this policy form involves the whole theory of
this type of insurance and the manner in which claims are handled. It pro-
vides, in part:
The Insured may employ attorneys to investigate, defend or negotiate for the
settlement of any claim, provided always that they shall at all times coop-
erate to the fullest extent with the Insurer and the attorneys designated by
the Insurer and give due regard to opinions expressed by them. The Insured
shall not admit or assume any liability or incur any expenses in connection
with such claim without the written consent of the Insurer, but such con-
sent shall not be unreasonably withheld. All reasonable disbursements and
fees of the Insured's attorneys incurred in connection with such claim shall
be considered a part of the loss with reference to which such fees and dis-
bursements were incurred.'
The London and American forms have different provisions concerning
attorneys. The American form limits the sums payable for attorney fees;
the London form requires all the assureds to use the same attorney. If they
cannot agree, he will be selected by a person named in the declarations of
the policy and by attorneys for the insurer. There are some other differences
in the forms which should be examined, especially such as relate to the
order of payment of claims when the claims exceed the policy coverage
limit.
Individual Director's Liability Policy. At least one insurance company
issues an Individual Director's Liability Policy.""9 It is intended to protect
an individual serving on one or more outside boards of directors. The word
"director" is defined in the contract to mean "only an outside director and
shall not include such Insured acting in a dual capacity as Chairman of the
Board, salaried corporate officer, or employee of the Corporation(s)
named .... If during the policy period, the position of the insured Di-
rector shall change from that described above, then coverage in reference
to that Corporation shall cease to apply." The coverage provided and the
exclusions contained in this policy are similar to the Directors' and Officers'
Liability part of the two-part D and 0 policy. However, it is well to pay
particular attention to two specific provisions. Paragraph III (2) extends
coverage to negligent acts occurring prior to the policy period, but adds
the proviso "(a) the Insured at the effective date of the Policy had no
knowlege or could not have reasonably foreseen any circumstance which
147 Id.
14s Id. cl. 111(b).
149 St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Form 16254 DLP-Rev. 1-67.
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might result in a claim or suit, or (b) there is no other insurance applic-
able to such negligent act, error, omission or breach of duty." That pro-
viso is related to item 7 of the proposal form for the policy upon which
the company relies in issuing the policy. That item states: "No person pro-
posed for insurance is cognizant of any act, omission or error which he has
reason to suppose might afford valid grounds for any future claim such as
would fall within the scope of the proposed insurance except as follows
. " Thus, an individual director insured under that policy faces the
same duty of disclosure as in the regular D and 0 forms, and may be con-
fronted with questions similar to those now before the courts in the Penn
Central litigation."'
III. CONCLUSION
Especially since the BarChris decision,... the questions relating to indem-
nification and insurance of corporate officers and directors have become
increasingly complicated. Seeking only to raise questions, not to answer
them, it seems appropriate to consider the applicability of D and 0 liability
insurance to corporate directors who function in dual capacities. The
attorney-director, the accountant-director, the engineer-director, the under-
writer-director all may face special problems.
As is noted above, many of the D and 0 policies restrict coverage to
liability imposed upon insureds "solely by reason of their being such
Officers and Directors.""' If, then, the liability of an underwriter-director
is greater or different than that of a director who is not an underwriter, 153
will such additional or different responsibility be covered by the D and 0
policy? If, perchance, an attorney-director has undertaken the preparation
of a prospectus, and thereby incurs special liability as an attorney-director,
is he protected?'54
Without engaging in "scare tactics," it is quite proper to recognize that
an individual director-be he "inside," or "outside," or "expert," or in a
dual capacity, or what-is accountable to his corporation's shareholders, to
corporate creditors and to governmental agencies and departments. How
well he can be protected against personal loss by proper indemnification
and adequate, reasonably-priced liability insurance, may be the measure
of how well he will be able to do his job.
"0 See text accompanying notes 136-42 supra.
... Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 ]. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
.. See discussion of the definition of "Wrongful Act," in text accompanying notes 117-24
supra.
"' Perhaps by virtue of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77k (1971).
..






























































Code of Alabama tit. 10, § 21 (Supp. 1969)
Alaska Statutes § 10.05.009(15) (1962)
Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-198B (Supp. 1970)
Arkansas Statutes § 64-309 (1966)
California Corporations Code Annotated § 830 (West Supp. 1971)
Colorado Revised Statutes 5 31-2-1 (1963)
Connecticut General Statutes Annotated 5 33-320 (Supp. 1969)
Delaware Code Annotated tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1968)
District of Columbia Code Encyclopedia
Annotated § 29-904 (1968)
Florida Statutes Annotated § 608.13 (Supp. 1971)
Georgia Code Annotated § 22-717 (1970)
Hawaii Revised Statutes § 416-26(16) (1968)
no statute
no statute
Burns' Annotated Statutes 5 25-209 (1970)
Iowa Code § 496A.4 (1967)
Kansas Statutes Annotated 5 17-3010 (Supp. 1970)
Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated
55 271.25(11), 271.375 (1969)
West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated tit. 12, § 83 (1969)
Maine Revised Statutes Annotated tit. 13, 5 146 (Supp. 1970)
Maryland Annotated Code art. 23, § 64 (Supp. 1970)
Massachusetts General Laws Annotated ch. 156B, § 67 (1959)
Michigan Compiled Laws § 450.10(1) (1967)
Minnesota Statutes Annotated § 301.09 (1969)
Mississippi Code 1942, 5 5309-04 (Supp. 1971)
Missouri Revised Statutes S 351.355 (1966)
Montana Revised Codes 1947 Annotated § 15-2204 (1967)
Nebraska Revised Statutes § 21-2004(15) (1970)
Nevada Revised Statutes § 78.070 (1969)
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated
§ 294:4(IX) (Supp. 1970)
New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 14A:3-5 (1969)
New Mexico Statutes 1953 Annotated § 51-24-4
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York,
Business Corporation Law § 721-26 (1963)
North Carolina General Statutes §§ 55-19 to -21 (Supp. 1969)
North Dakota Century Code § 10-19-04, subsec. 15 (1960)
Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 1701.13 (E) (Page Supp. 1970)
Oklahoma Statutes tit. 18, 5 1.43a (Supp. 1970)
Oregon Revised Statutes § 57.030 (1969)
Purdon's Statutes Annotated tit. 15, § 1516 (1967)
Puerto Rico Laws Annotated tit. 14, § 1202
Rhode Island General Laws Annotated § 7-1.1-4.1 (Supp. 1970)
South Carolina Code 1962, 5 12-12.2(18) (Supp. 1970)
South Dakota Compiled Laws 1967, § 47-2-58(15) (1967)
Tennessee Code Annotated 5 48-407 (Supp. 1970)
Texas Business Corporation Act Annotated
art. 2.02A(16) (1956)
Utah Code Annotated § 16-10-4(o) (Supp. 1969)
no statute
Virginia Code Annotated § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1970)
Virgin Islands Code tit. 13, § 30(10) (1966)
Washington Revised Code § 23A.08.025 (Supp. 1970)
West Virginia Code § 31-1-18a (1966)
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 5 180.407 (Supp. 1971)
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APPENDIX B
Statutory Provisions Authorizing Liability Insurance
Alabama Code of Alabama tit. 10, § 21(g) (Supp. 1969)
California California Corporations Code Annotated S 830(h) (West Supp. 1971)
Delaware Delaware Code Annotated tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968)
Georgia Georgia Code Annotated § 22-717(g) (1970)
Kansas Kansas Statutes Annotated S 17-3010(g) (Supp. 1970)
Louisiana West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated § 83(f) (1969)
Massachusetts Massachusetts General Laws Annotated ch. 156B, § 67 (1959)
Minnesota Minnesota Statutes Annotated § 301.095, subdiv. 7 (1969)
Nevada Nevada Revised Code § 78.070-3(7) (1969)
New Jersey New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 14A:3-5(9) (1969)
New York McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Business
Corporation Law § 727 (Supp. 1970)
Ohio Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 1701.13(3) ('Page Supp. 1970)
Oklahoma Oklahoma Statutes tit. 18, § 1.43 (g) (Supp. 1970)
Rhode Island General Laws of Rhode Island § 7-1.1-4.1 (g) (Supp. 1970)
Utah Utah Code Annotated § 16-10-4(o) (7) (Supp. 1969)
Virginia Virginia Code Annotated § 13.1-3.1(g) (Supp. 1970)
Washington Washington Revised Code § 23A.08.025 (7) (Supp. 1970)
